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A Little Overlap Never Hurt Anyone: 
Overlapping IP Rights and Oracle 




Intellectual property (“IP”) protections have traditionally been mutually exclusive; 
an innovator who obtains one type of protection could not obtain another on the 
same invention. Though the possibility of overlapping IP rights has changed sub-
stantially over the years, the general opinion remained one of disapproval until re-
cently. In Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google LLC, the Federal Circuit voiced approval of 
overlapping IP rights. This article examines the history of overlapping IP rights and 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The domains of copyright and patent laws, specifically utility patent laws, have 
traditionally remained separate in the kinds of innovation they regulate.1 Copyright 
is intended to protect “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium 
of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, 
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine 
or device.”2 Utility patents, however, are intended to protect new and useful tech-
nologies such as machines, processes, manufactures, and compositions of matter.3 
The Supreme Court has previously discussed the distinction between copyright and 
patent protections.4 Though the differences between copyrights and utility patents 
are clear, there are conflicting opinions about overlapping these intellectual prop-
erty (“IP”) protections.5 
In 2018, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued the most recent 
opinion in Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google LLC.6 Though the decision solely addressed 
the issue of fair use in copyright law,7 the initial case saw Oracle asserting both 
copyright and patent protections in response to the same infringing action by 
Google.8 This article discusses the court allowing Oracle to assert overlapping IP 
protections and argues that courts should allow parties to overlap various IP protec-
tions—so long as they are careful not to conflate the standards for obtaining protec-
tions provided by each kind of IP protection. 
Part II of this article summarizes the procedural history of the Oracle case. Part 
III examines previous legal guidance on the issue of overlapping IP protections, 
including case law and a well-respected treatise on copyright. Part IV provides an 
in-depth discussion of the differences between patent and copyright protections, as 
well as how appropriate judicial interpretation and care at the U.S. Copyright Office 
can preclude some of the risks associated with overlapping IP rights. Finally, Part 
V argues that the Federal Circuit expressed the appropriate relationship between 
patent and copyright protections, and that allowing innovators to place their crea-
tions within multiple statutory classes, so long the protections are warranted, fur-
thers the goal of the “Intellectual Property Clause” by providing a greater reward 
for innovation, thus further incentivizing the “Progress of [s]cience and useful [a]rts 
. . . .”9 
 
 1. The U.S. Constitution distinguishes between copyright and patent, allowing for Congress to “se-
cur[e] for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 2. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
 3. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 4. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (holding that the protections sought by the plaintiff were 
the domain of patent law and could not be obtained through copyright alone). 
 5. See Fulmer v. U.S., 103 F. Supp. 1021 (1952) (treating some aspects of IP as copyrightable and 
others as patentable); but see Louis Dejonge & Co v. Breuker & Kessler Co, 182 F. 150, 152 (C.C.E.D. 
Pa. 1910) (“Since it was qualified for admission into the two statutory classes, I see no reason why it 
might not be placed in either. But it could not enter both. The method of procedure, the term of protec-
tion, and the penalties for infringement, are so different that the author or owner of a painting that is 
eligible for both classes must decide to which region of intellectual effort the work is to be assigned, and 
he must abide by the decision.”). 
 6. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 7. Id. at 1190. 
 8. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 974, 975 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
 9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF ORACLE V. GOOGLE 
The United States District Court for the Northern District of California handed 
down the first opinion in the Oracle v. Google issue in 2012. The case arose from 
Google’s use of the Java language, specifically Oracle’s Application Programming 
Interfaces (“APIs”) in creating Google’s Android platform.10 Though Google did 
discuss the possibility of obtaining a license from Sun Microsystems for the use of 
Java,11 the parties failed to reach an agreement.12 This prompted Google to use the 
Java language anyway—without permission—to design its own virtual machine. 
This was achieved by copying 37 API packages, including the name, organization, 
and functionality, from Java.13 Oracle filed its lawsuit in 2010, alleging that 
Google’s Android platform infringed both Java-related patents and copyrights.14 
The complexity of the case prompted the court to decide that the jury would be more 
likely to follow along if the trial were conducted in three phases: the first phase 
would discuss copyrightability and copyright infringement; the second phase would 
discuss patent-related aspects of the case; and the third phase (which was precluded 
by the verdict) would deal with damages.15 At the conclusion of the trial, the jury 
was responsible for deciding issues of infringement and fair use, while the judge 
decided the issue of copyrightability and Google’s equitable defenses.16 
The jury found no copyright infringement and no patent infringement.17 The 
judge ruled that an API was not copyrightable, stating that “it is nevertheless a com-
mand structure, a system or method of operation—a long hierarchy of over six thou-
sand commands to carry out pre-assigned functions. For that reason, it cannot re-
ceive copyright protection; however, patent protection may still be possible.”18 This 
ruling comes from 17 U.S.C. § 102(b), which excludes processes and systems from 
copyright protection; copyright is meant to protect “expression,” while patents pro-
tect new and useful inventions or processes.19 The ruling of the court was not ex-
tended to cover the issue of patentability.20 
The case was appealed by both parties to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit, but the patent claims were no longer at issue.21 After delib-
erating, the Federal Circuit reached a conclusion on copyrightability contrary to that 
of the previous court.22 When considering the copyrightability of an API, the Fed-
eral Circuit stated, “[s]ection 102(b) does not bar the packages from copyright pro-
tection just because they also perform functions.”23 Though the patent claims were 
not at issue in this appeal, Google argued that the subject matter should only be 
 
 10. Oracle Am., Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d at 978. 
 11. Sun Microsystems developed Java in 1996 and was obtained by Oracle Corporation in 2010. See 
Id. at 975, 977–78. 
 12. Id. at 978. 
 13. Id. at 977–78. 
 14. Id. at 975. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 976. 
 18. Id. at 999–1000. 
 19. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b); 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952). 
 20. Oracle Am., Inc. 872 F. Supp. at 976. 
 21. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 22. Id. at 1381. 
 23. Id. at 1368. (17 U.S.C. § 102(b) details the subject matter of copyright, enumerating several pro-
tected categories and excluding several others.) 
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protectable by patent.24 The Federal Circuit rejected this contention, declining to set 
precedent that computer programs are protectable only through patent, and citing 
several critics who argue that copyright is a more appropriate medium for protecting 
software.25 The court’s decision effectively allows programming to be classified as 
a type of creative endeavor, the product of which may be creative enough to earn 
copyright protection instead of a purely functional product only suitable for patent 
protection. With the decision that an API is copyrightable subject matter, the case 
then rested on whether Google’s use of the API could be considered fair use—a 
question to be answered by the Northern District of California.26 
On remand in 2016, a jury once again found for Google, stating that here, the 
company’s use of the Java APIs fell within the fair use defense.27 In response, Ora-
cle argued that no reasonable jury could have come to a finding of fair use and 
moved for judgment as a matter of law.28 The court then analyzed the four fair use 
factors: (1) the purpose and character of the use, (2) the nature of the copyrighted 
work, (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole, and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for 
or value of the copyrighted work.29 After interpreting these factors in light of the 
facts at issue, the court held that a reasonable jury could have found fair use and 
denied Oracle’s motion.30 
Oracle once again appealed the case to the Federal Circuit from the district 
court’s final judgment, denial of judgement as a matter of law, and denial of Ora-
cle’s motion for a new trial.31 The Federal Circuit examined each factor of the fair 
use affirmative defense at length, starting with the purpose and character of the 
use.32 Despite Google’s arguments that Android was free under an open-source li-
cense, and that Google made its money from advertisements instead of the Android 
system itself, the court held that giving a product away for free does not preclude a 
finding of commercial use: Google’s use could be—and ultimately was—commer-
cial (a fact which, in turn, weighed against a finding of fair use).33 Additionally, the 
court found that since Google had not substantially changed the APIs, but rather 
copied 11,500 lines of code directly, the use was not transformative.34 Taking the 
first factor as a whole, the Federal Circuit found that, even without a finding of bad 
faith from Google, the purpose and character of the use “strongly support[s] the 
conclusion that the first factor weighs against a finding of fair use.”35 
 
 24. Id. at 1379–1380. 
 25. Id. at 1380 (citing Technology Quarterly, Stalking Trolls, ECONOMIST (Mar. 8, 2014), http://www. 
economist.com/news/technology-quarterly/21598 321–intellectual–property–after–being–blamed-sty-
mying-innovation-america-vague; Timothy B. Lee, Will the Supreme Court save us from software pa-
tents?, WASH. POST (Feb. 26, 2014, 1:13 PM), http://www.washingtonpost. com/blogs/the-
switch/wp/2014/02/26/will-the-supreme-court-save-us-from-software-patents/.). 
 26. Id. at 1381. (Fair use of copyrighted subject matter is not considered infringement). 
 27. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., C 10-03561 WHA, 2016 WL 3181206, (N.D. Cal. June 8, 2016), 
rev’d and remanded sub nom. 886 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 28. Id. at *1. 
 29. Id. at *6–*10; 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992). 
 30. Oracle Am., Inc., 2016 WL 3181206, at *1. 
 31. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 32. Id. at 1196–98. 
 33. Id. at 1197 (citing A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
 34. Id. at 1187–1202. 
 35. Id. at 1204. 
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The second factor of the fair use analysis lent itself to a finding of fair use.36 
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit noted that, despite this factor supporting Google’s 
position, the Ninth Circuit “has recognized[…] that this second factor ‘typically has 
not been terribly significant in the overall fair use balancing.’”37 The amount and 
substantiality of the portion used compared with the copyrighted work as a whole 
was stated by the Federal Circuit to be a more flexible determination which could 
not be solved by simply taking a ratio of the amount of work that was copied ver-
batim.38 
The court also emphasized that consideration of the third factor requires exam-
ining the magnitude of the copied work in light of the original work, not the infring-
ing work.39 Though Google only copied a small portion of Java as a collective lan-
guage, the APIs themselves contained a substantial amount of code, enough that the 
Federal Circuit did not consider the copying to be “insignificant.”40 Overall, the 
third fair use factor did not weigh heavily in favor of either party.41 
The final fair use factor, the effect upon the potential market, was emphasized 
by the Federal Circuit to be the single most important factor in the fair use inquiry.42 
In examining this factor, the court dispensed with Google’s assertion that a jury 
could have found no market harm based on the fact that Oracle was not a device 
manufacturer and did not have a smartphone platform.43 Direct competition is not 
the only form of market harm. For example, the fourth fair use factor also includes 
the potential to enter related markets and the ability of a copyright holder to “deter-
mine ‘when, “whether, and in what form to release”‘ the copyrighted work into new 
markets.”44 According to this formulation, Google’s use of Oracle’s APIs had a 
substantial effect upon the market, thus, the factor weighed against fair use.45 
Due to its application of the four fair use factors, the Federal Circuit held that 
Google’s use of the 37 Java APIs was not fair use as a matter of law and remanded 
the case to the Northern District of California for a finding on damages.46 Most 
recently, Google petitioned for certiorari, and the Supreme Court has asked the So-
licitor General for his thoughts on the case. 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
This part provides an overview of doctrines and treatises pertinent to the issue 
of overlapping IP protections. Subpart A examines the evolving view of the courts 
on the issue of overlapping IP rights. Subpart B discusses the Nimmer treatise on 
copyright law and its suggestions about how copyright and patent should be allowed 
to interact. 
 
 36. Id. at 1205 (stating that a “reasonable jurors could have concluded that functional considerations 
were both substantial and important.” The thrust of the discussion was whether creating APIs was a 
creative process). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 1207. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 1209. 
 44. Id. at 1208–10. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 1211. 
5
Weidner: A Little Overlap Never Hurt Anyone: Overlapping IP Rights and Ora
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2020
No. 1] Weidner: Oracle v. Google 217 
A. Overview of Case Law Regarding Overlapping IP Pro-
tections 
One of the first cases regarding overlapping IP protections is the 1879 Supreme 
Court case Baker v. Selden.47 The complainant (Selden) in Baker had appropriately 
copyrighted a book that contained instructions on using a particular system of 
bookkeeping.48 The defendant (Baker) made and used books containing a very sim-
ilar system to the one present in Selden’s copyrighted work.49 The question at issue 
was whether the use of a particular bookkeeping system could be restricted based 
solely upon a copyright on a book describing the process of how to use the system.50 
The Court also took the opportunity to discuss the differences between copyright 
protections and utility patent protections.51 
The first question addressed by the Court was whether Selden could prevent 
other people from using his bookkeeping system on the basis of his copyright—a 
proposition which the Court firmly denied.52 Instead of granting the desired exclu-
sivity, the Court stated that “[t]he copyright of a work on mathematical science can-
not give to the author an exclusive right to the methods of operation which he pro-
pounds, or to the diagrams which he employs to explain them, so as to prevent an 
engineer from using them whenever occasion requires.”53 In making this statement, 
the Court effectively ruled that a copyright protects only the particular expression 
of the author, not the underlying method of the work.54 
The second important point made by the Court concerned the difference in the 
dominions of patent and copyright protections.55 The Court summarized the differ-
ences between the two types of IP protections, using medicine as an example: 
[i]f the discoverer writes and publishes a book on the subject. . .he gains 
no exclusive right to the manufacture and sale of the medicine; . . . If he 
desires to acquire such exclusive right, he must obtain a patent for the mix-
ture as a new art, manufacture, or composition of matter. He may copyright 
his book, if he pleases; but that only secures to him the exclusive right of 
printing and publishing his book.56 
Baker has since been interpreted as treating utility patent and copyright as “mutually 
exclusive forms of IP protections for intellectual creations.”57 This interpretation of 
Baker has carried over to other cases from lower courts, such as the decision in 
Taylor Instrument Cos. v. Fawley-Brost Co, a case concerning graphical charts cre-
ated by the plaintiff for use in conjunction with a recording thermometer which 
 
 47. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). 
 48. Id. at 100. 
 49. Id. at 100-101. 
 50. Id. at 101 (More broadly, the issue was whether a copyright on a book provides exclusivity to the 
contents of the book). 
 51. Id. at 102–103. 
 52. Id. at 103. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 102–103. 
 57. Pamela Samuelson, Strategies for Discerning the Boundaries of Copyright and Patent Protec-
tions, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1493, 1500 (2017). 
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were copied by the defendant.58 The defendant presented several patents which cov-
ered recording thermometers and included representations of the copied charts.59 
The plaintiff responded that “none of these patents would give the defendant meas-
urements necessary for printing the charts alleged to infringe.”60 In its discussion of 
patents and copyrights, the Seventh Circuit addressed this argument and opined that 
the two IP protections should remain separate, stating that “[t]his argument, if true, 
ignores the fact that it now seeks protection in the copyright field for an art long 
protected in the field of patents, and where undoubtedly it still belongs.”61 
Though Baker has echoed throughout case law for more than a century, the 
Supreme Court has expressed views somewhat at odds with the principles that its 
older decision has come to stand for. One such decision is Mazer v. Stein, a case 
concerning statuettes meant to be used as lamp bases.62 In Mazer, the petitioners 
copied and sold lamp bases that were copyrighted by the respondent, resulting in 
the respondent filing for copyright infringement.63 The petitioner responded, saying 
that a copyright did not provide protection from “industrial reproduction of the pro-
tected article.”64 The Court noted that the petitioner fought against the idea of over-
lapping IP protections that would give an inventor “a choice between patents and 
copyrights.”65 Despite this argument, the Court held—contrary to its earlier deci-
sion in Baker—that “the patentability of the statuettes, fitted as lamps or unfitted, 
does not bar copyright as works of art. Neither the Copyright Statute nor any other 
says that because a thing is patentable it may not be copyrighted. We should not so 
hold.”66 
The Court went on to discuss the difference in the protections between copy-
right and patent—namely that copyright protects originality, whereas a patent pro-
tects novelty.67 This was further explained by a metaphor of two men who inde-
pendently make the exact same map, resulting in both men having the exclusive 
right to reproduce their own map, even though they are identical, without either 
infringing the other’s copyright.68 Furthermore, the Court expressly addressed the 
economic policy of allowing both patent and copyright protections: 
[t]he economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to 
grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of indi-
vidual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare 
through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’ 
Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards com-
mensurate with the services rendered.69 
 
 58. Taylor Instrument Cos. v. Fawley-Brost Co., 139 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1943). 
 59. Id. at 101. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 101. 
 62. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 202 (1954). 
 63. Id. at 203. 
 64. Id. at 205. 
 65. Id. at 216. 
 66. Compare id. at 217, with Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). 
 67. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 218. 
 68. Id. (citing Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, D.C., 298 F. 145, 151). 
 69. Id. at 219. 
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Though this decision represents a more favorable view regarding overlapping IP 
protections, the Court still limited the ability to overlap.70 Mazer has been inter-
preted to represent the “election” doctrine as opposed to the “siloing” doctrine of 
Baker.71 The doctrine of “siloing” forces subject matter into separate categories, 
meaning a single work or invention may be either copyrightable or patentable, but 
not both.72 The less stringent doctrine of “election” acknowledges that subject mat-
ter may be considered both copyrightable and patentable subject matter, but requires 
the claimant to choose only one type of protection for their innovation.73 While 
“election” represents a favorable trend for overlapping IP rights, the end result for 
“siloing” and “election” remains largely the same. Following this decision, the Cop-
yright Office adopted the election doctrine.74 Though not fully embracing the idea 
of overlapping IP protections, the shift from “siloing” to “election” signifies the 
Supreme Court’s gradual transition from an overwhelmingly negative view on over-
lapping IP protections to a more positive one. 
B. The Nimmer Treatise 
The Mazer decision was an early step toward increasingly widespread ac-
ceptance of overlapping IP rights. A well-respected (and regularly-updated) treatise 
on copyright, written by Melville Nimmer in 1963 (“the Nimmer treatise”), fully 
supports the idea of allowing a single innovation to be covered by multiple types of 
IP protections, especially by highlighting the possibility of overlapping copyright 
and patent protections.75 As originally published, the Nimmer treatise supported the 
notion that protection under one body of IP law should not serve as a strict bar 
against the ability to gain other protections.76 This view is criticized at the Copyright 
Office’s adoption of the election doctrine, which states that 
[i]t would seem on principle that if a work otherwise meets the require-
ments of copyrightability, it should not be denied such simply because the 
claimant happens to be entitled to supplementary protection under other 
legislation. In any event, such Regulations go beyond the teachings of a 
recent case which suggest that even if a patent has been issued if such pa-
tent is subsequently found to be invalid then copyright protection should 
be available.77 
The Nimmer treatise focuses extensively on the co-existence of design patents and 
copyright protections, but the advent of Oracle v. Google spurred the authors to 
address copyright’s potential overlap with utility patents.78 Initially, the Nimmer 
 
 70. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §2A.07 (2019). 
 71. Id. § 2A.07(B)(3). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. § 2A.07(C)(3)(a). 
 75. Id. 
 76. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 38 (1963) (footnote omit-
ted). 
 77. Id. (referencing Barton Candy Corp. v. Tell Chocolate Novelties Corp., 178 F. Supp. 577 
(E.D.N.Y. 1959), which found that the design patent and copyright at issue covered different subject 
matter). 
 78. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 70, § 2A.07(A). 
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treatise posits that the facts of Oracle v. Google may not have given rise to the ideal 
situation for addressing the overlap of utility patents and copyrights, because the 
patents at issue in the first iteration of the case did not cover identical subject matter 
to the copyrights that have been extensively litigated since.79 Despite this objection, 
the treatise responds to the Federal Circuit’s action of throwing down the proverbial 
gauntlet on the issue of overlapping IP rights, taking a more conservative view when 
the overlap concerns a utility patent.80 The treatise supports the idea that a physical 
product could be protected by copyrights and utility patents, but does not accept 
such an overlap when it protects subject matter such as software—something that 
has a more nebulous distinction between its physical form and functional purpose.81 
IV. DISCUSSION OF OVERLAPPING IP RIGHTS 
Subpart A of Part IV provides a more in-depth examination of the differences 
between the protections provided by the grant of a patent and the grant of a copy-
right. Subpart B expounds on how judicial care can allow for overlapping IP pro-
tections while minimizing risk of abuse by the rights-holders. 
A. Discussion of Differences Between Patent and Copyright 
One common argument posed against the concept of allowing overlapping IP 
rights is the fear of a rights holder either obtaining greater rights than their disclo-
sure should allow (i.e., obtaining the rights of a patent holder while only making a 
showing sufficient for a copyright similar to the attempt in Baker) or maintaining 
strong rights for longer than statutorily allowed (i.e., trying to enforce the rights of 
a patent holder for the term of a copyright).82 This is a valid concern; patents grant 
stronger protections than copyrights, while copyrights have a much longer term than 
patents.83 Allowing an inventor who holds both a patent and a copyright on one 
innovation to conflate the rights and term of the grants could result in an improper 
monopoly far beyond what was contemplated in the Constitution.84 Judicial care in 
 
 79. Id. at § (4)(b) (“Accordingly, it would have been preferable for the Federal Circuit to decline to 
enter this hornet’s nest. Instead, however, the court willingly entered the fray.”). 
 80. Id. § 2A.07(4). 
 81. Id. (“As thus viewed, it no longer becomes accurate to refer to patent and copyright protection 
attaching to the identical subject matter. To be sure, they could both pertain to matters embodied in the 
same physical item. But their protection is separate, inasmuch as they attach to different aspects of that 
item.”) (This hesitance arises from the seemingly conflicting requirements for obtaining a utility patent 
and a copyright on innovations such as software. Whereas a patent on a process performed by code may 
be obtained, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) excludes from copyrightability procedures, processes, and methods of 
operation, along with several other things. In a situation where the expression is closely tied to the func-
tionality of an innovation, the treatise posits that a utility patent may serve as evidence that the expression 
is the process). 
 82. See Viva R. Moffat, Mutant Copyrights and Backdoor Patents: The Problem of Overlapping In-
tellectual Property Protection, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1473, 1512–13 (2004). 
 83. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1998) (“Copyright in a work created on or after January 1, 1978, 
subsists from its creation and, except as provided by the following subsections, 
endures for a term consisting of the life of the author and 70 years after the 
author’s death.); 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2015) (“such grant shall be for a term beginning on the date on 
which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which the application for the patent was 
filed in the United States. . .”); 35 U.S.C. § 173 (“Patents for designs shall be granted for the term of 15 
years from the date of grant.”). 
 84. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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both granting and interpreting IP rights, however, can ameliorate this particular is-
sue. 
A clear understanding of the difference between utility patents and copyrights 
is essential to understand why overlapping these protections should not prove prob-
lematic. The grant of a copyright and the grant of a patent are quite different in the 
rights they provide to their respective rights holders. A copyright grants its holder 
the right to do.85 Specifically, a copyright holder can reproduce, prepare derivative 
works from, distribute copies of, perform, or display their copyrighted work.86 The 
grant of a copyright explicitly gives its holder the right to do any of these things 
with their work.87 Though a holder of a copyright may use their copyrighted subject 
matter, they do not have an absolute right to bar others from using that same subject 
matter.88 Fair use,89 certain reproduction by libraries,90 and various other exceptions 
allow others to use copyrighted subject matter without infringing a copyright.91 
Finally, the subject matter of copyright is limited to “original works of author-
ship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, 
from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either 
directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”92 Not only does § 102 limit the 
scope by identifying what may be included in copyright protection; it also limits the 
scope of copyright by excluding certain subject matter from copyright protection.93 
Section 102(b) excludes “any idea, procedure, process, system, method of opera-
tion, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, 
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”94 This section provides a signif-
icant hurdle for one seeking to obtain copyright protections. 
Patent protections grant rights in opposition to those rights gained through cop-
yright protections.95 A patent grants the right to exclude.96 While a patentee may 
prevent all others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling their invention, 
it does not give them the right to perform their invention.97 A patent on an invention 
containing subject matter that would be illegal to make or use, while valid, does not 
suddenly allow the patentee to perform illegal acts to make use of their patented 
invention. Additionally, the exclusive right given by patent is stronger than that 
given by copyright, as there are far fewer limitations on the exclusive right provided 
by a patent. Utility patents are also limited in the subject matter they are allowed to 
cover.98 Section 101 limits patentable subject matter to “any new and useful pro-
cess, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
 
 85. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. 17 U.S.C. §§ 107–112. 
 89. 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 90. 17 U.S.C. § 108 (2005). 
 91. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 109-112 for other limitations on exclusive rights. 
 92. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (the statute then enumerates several examples of “works of authorship,” recit-
ing: literary works; musical works; dramatic works; choreographic works; pictorial, graphic, and sculp-
tural works; audiovisual works; sound recordings; and architectural works). 
 93. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
 94. Id. 
 95. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2018). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
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improvement thereof. . .”99 Aside from providing the four traditional categories, this 
statute also provides the requirement of usefulness.100 
Examining the language that defines copyrights and patents shows the several 
distinctions that, when carefully construed by courts, can eliminate the risk of al-
lowing rights holders to improperly gain or extend IP rights. Copyrights only pro-
tect the rights holder’s particular expression, whereas utility patents protect the un-
derlying invention.101 The Nimmer treatise mentions this distinction when it states 
that, where there is a patented physical product, the patent and the copyright, while 
embodied in the same product, cover very different aspects of that product.102 As 
expressed in the treatise, 
[t]o be sure, they could both pertain to matters embodied in the same phys-
ical item. But their protection is separate, inasmuch as they attach to dif-
ferent aspects of that item. In Weil’s example, copyright applies to the ex-
ternal shape of the novel household utensil, utility patent to its internal 
mechanism.103 
B. Preventing Abuse with Care at the Copyright Office and 
in the Courts 
Distinguishing between an inventor’s individual expression and the novel, un-
derlying functionality (the Nimmer treatise’s “internal mechanism”) allows for the 
existence of overlapping IP protections by preventing innovators from improperly 
obtaining, expanding, or extending those rights. The difference between expression 
and functionality is readily apparent, especially where there is a physical product. 
The patentable subject matter—the novel process, machine, manufacture, or com-
position of matter—should be separated from the copyrightable subject matter be-
fore evaluating the rights provided by each protection.104 
When the patent term expires, the patentable subject matter, which should be 
clearly separate from the copyrightable subject matter, enters the public domain.105 
Others may now practice the patent or its equivalents so long as they create their 
own expression, or “external shape,”106 while doing so. Using the book and book-
keeping system in Baker as an example, had Selden obtained a utility patent on the 
bookkeeping system as well as the copyright on the book,107 he would have been 
able to exclude others from using the book-keeping method enumerated in the book 
for 20 years. During the same period, Selden’s copyright would give him the right 
to do the subject matter of the copyright. During the co-existence of the rights, Sel-
den would have the right both to exclude others from using the method and the right 
to use his book describing the use of the system. Once the patent expires, Selden 
would lose his right to exclude others from using the bookkeeping method. He is 
 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See 17 U.S.C. § 102; 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
 102. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 70, § 2A.07(D)(4)(c)(ii). 
 103. Id. 
 104. 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
 105. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2015). 
 106. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 70, § 2A.07(A)(4)(c)(ii). 
 107. No patent was actually obtained, but for the purpose of clarification we are pretending there was. 
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left with a copyright protecting his work of authorship—the book—but can no 
longer prevent others from using the underlying system (so long as they do not copy 
the book). The copyright grants only the exclusive right to reproduce, prepare, dis-
tribute, etc., the book itself, it does not cover the bookkeeping method.108 
By strictly limiting the copyright to the expression of the original product and 
excluding from copyright the functionality of the product, courts can quickly dis-
patch rights holders who attempt to use their copyright to prevent others from using 
the formerly patented subject matter. They would simultaneously be able to prevent 
attempts to extend patent protections beyond their term. Returning to the hypothet-
ical example above, after the patent expires, Selden may attempt to argue, as he did 
in the actual case, that his copyright over the book describing the use of his method 
grants him exclusive right to the method itself.109 As the Court held in 1879,110 
without a patent on the bookkeeping method, or in the hypothetical case after the 
expiration of a patent on the bookkeeping method, Selden can only prevent others 
from copying the expression within his book. So long as the party using the method 
creates a new expression, as did Baker, they can use the method with impunity.111 
Properly construing the subject matter of copyrights and patents can allow courts to 
permit overlapping IP rights without increasing the risk of improper use of those 
rights. 
Distinguishing copyrightable and patentable aspects of an innovation is rela-
tively simple when there is a physical embodiment of that product. The issue be-
comes more complicated, however, when the product is more abstract, such as the 
APIs in Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc.112 In instances such as this, the expression 
becomes much more difficult to extricate from the idea itself. Indeed, even the Nim-
mer treatise is hesitant to accept the Federal Circuit’s contention that patentability 
does not bar copyrightability even when there is not a physical item in considera-
tion.113 Once again, carefully granting IP rights and construing the protections they 
provide can reduce the risk of improper exclusivity. 
Before courts get the chance to construe the protections granted by overlapping 
IP rights, the Copyright Office should be able to reduce the chance of exploitation 
of that overlap, even when the protections cover a virtual product instead of a phys-
ical one. First, both offices must distinguish between the expression and the idea 
behind the innovation. With virtual products, such as the APIs in Oracle Am., Inc. 
v. Google Inc., there is another necessary step: the Copyright Office must solve the 
intertwinement issue for the expression of a virtual product, such as lines of code, 
with the functionality of the product itself. 
Though there is generally more than one way to write code to perform a func-
tion, this may not be true in every case. Depending on the Copyright Office’s deci-
sion on whether the functionality is entirely dependent on the expression, the Nim-
mer treatise presents the appropriate solution in the merger doctrine.114 If the func-
tionality of the product is not exclusive to the particular expression employed by 
 
 108. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
 109. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). 
 110. Id. 
 111. See id. at 100 (discussing how the defendant had used a different arrangement of columns and 
different headings). 
 112. See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 113. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 70, § 2A.07(A)(4). 
 114. Id. § 2A.06(B)(1)(b). 
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the inventor, there should be no risk—assuming courts interpret the coverage of the 
rights properly—that granting a copyright would result in a patent-like monopoly 
for the rights holder.115 When the expression is too closely intertwined with the 
functionality of the product, Nimmer states that 
[o]nly in those few instances in which conferring a monopoly over a given 
expression would in fact stymie others from expressing the idea embodied 
therein, such that the idea and its expression ‘merge’ into one, should the 
courts afford relief, either as a question of copyrightability or during the 
infringement analysis.116 
The preceding quotation provides two separate ways of preventing copyright from 
extending into the area of patent: using the dependence of functionality on expres-
sion as a qualification for copyrightability, or using the same dependence as a de-
fense against infringement.117 While both of these solutions work, care at the Cop-
yright Office is more efficient, as it provides the inventor with the knowledge that 
their product is not copyrightable much earlier, possibly giving them the oppor-
tunity to apply for a more suitable IP protection. By separating the idea behind a 
product from the expression of that idea, while refusing to grant copyrights on prod-
ucts in which the function is unique to the expression (instead forcing those inven-
tions into only patent protections), overlapping IP rights can be safely applied to 
products without a definite physical form. 
Some scholars worry that allowing patent and copyright to exist in the same 
product will result in a scheme that runs contrary to the constitutionally-stated pur-
pose of promoting the advancement of science.118 The argument, in short, states that 
copyright can limit the ability of third parties to improve patented subject matter, 
and that patents can pre-empt fair use.119 As to this latter point, the argument ignores 
that fair use is not pre-empted for the lifetime of the copyright, but instead, the 
lifetime of the patent. If the rights holder can make a showing sufficient to obtain a 
patent, it follows that they would be rewarded with exclusive rights beyond the 
scope of copyright. These stronger rights, however, are the result of the patent and 
disappear when the patent term ends, once again allowing fair use. 
It is unlikely that copyright would limit the ability of third parties to improve a 
patented invention. While it is conceivable for a scenario to arise where a copy-
righted expression is substantially similar to every possible improvement to a pa-
tented invention, or is required for any improvement to function, this scenario 
would surely draw the gaze of the merger doctrine as functionality becomes increas-
ingly dependent upon expression. Furthermore, any prohibitive effect copyright 
may have is likely already imposed by patent law itself.120 
Another issue that courts must take care to avoid is overlapping damage 
awards. In allowing overlapping IP protections, courts open the possibility of at-
tempted double collecting on the part of plaintiffs suing for infringement. The prob-
lem of double collecting is solved, as many of the issues associated with 
 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See Moffat, supra note 82, at 1512–13. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2015); see also 35 U.S.C. § 103. 
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overlapping IP rights are, with judicial care. Ensuring that judges understand the 
exact scope of all IP rights associated with a product and when those rights are 
impinged can lessen the risk that a rights holder will be allowed to collect twice for 
a single infringement. 
V. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE WISDOM OF ORACLE V. GOOGLE 
The Federal Circuit expressed the appropriate rule concerning the intersection 
of copyright and patent when it quoted Mazer: 
Importantly for our purposes, the Supreme Court has made clear that 
“[n]either the Copyright Statute nor any other says that because a thing is 
patentable it may not be copyrighted.” Until either the Supreme Court or 
Congress tells us otherwise, we are bound to respect the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision to afford software programs protection under the copyright laws. 
We thus decline any invitation to declare that protection of software pro-
grams should be the domain of patent law, and only patent law.121 
With this decision, the Federal Circuit acknowledged that Oracle’s APIs could be 
protected by both copyright and patent laws. 
This decision fits with the analysis of virtual products in Part IV. The most 
recent decision in the string of cases explains the events leading to Google’s in-
fringement, recounting that “Google wanted to move quickly to develop a platform 
that would attract Java developers to build apps for Android. The Android team had 
been working on creating its own APIs, but was unable to do so successfully.”122 
Google’s actions suggest that it was possible for Google to create another set of 
APIs that performed the same function as Oracle’s without using an identical ex-
pression. Because the functionality of the APIs at question is detached from the 
expression used by Oracle, there is no need for the Federal Circuit to restrict the 
scope of Oracle’s copyright. The lack of identical coverage by the patents and cop-
yrights at issue in the first ruling makes the facts of the situation less than ideal for 
the Federal Circuit’s holding, but the principle stated by the court remains an ap-
propriate and sustainable statement of the law. So long as courts, the Copyright 
Office, and the Patent Office are careful in granting and construing IP protections, 
overlapping IP rights can help innovators gain stronger protections for their inven-
tions without increased risk of abuse by rights holders. 
Where multiple forms of IP protections are available on a single product, the 
protections can be construed as “thin” protections, which narrowly protect either 
the underlying idea or the exact expression. Oracle v. Google is a timely example 
of this. The first iteration of the case resulted in dismissal of both patent and copy-
right claims.123 The first appeal to the Federal Circuit revived the copyright claims, 
which promptly failed again at the district court, this time on fair use grounds.124 
Oracle did not obtain a favorable judgment until a second appeal to the Federal 
 
 121. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 
347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954)). 
 122. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179, 1187 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 123. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
 124. See Oracle Am., Inc., 750 F.3d at 1339; see also Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., C 10-03561 
WHA, 2016 WL 3181206 (N.D. Cal. June 8, 2016). 
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Circuit, in which the court walked through every element of fair use.125 The struggle 
for Oracle to successfully assert its rights illustrates how judicial interpretation can 
protect against improper expansion of IP protections.126 
Overlapping IP rights also further the aim of the IP Clause of the Constitution 
by “promot[ing] the progress of science and useful arts…”127 We grant patents and 
copyrights in the hope that the limited monopoly will provide enough of an incen-
tive to make investment into making new, unique expressions and novel, useful 
inventions attractive to both companies and individuals. The possibility of a copy-
right and a patent both have value. By allowing overlapping IP rights, the total value 
that could be provided by one innovation increases, meaning that a greater invest-
ment into science and useful arts can be justified. The value provided by overlap-
ping IP rights very well could be the final straw that results in the creation of an 
invention or expression that otherwise may have never seen the light of day. The 
Federal Circuit’s statement of the law upholds and furthers the goals of the Consti-
tution and allows a greater reward for innovation, consequently clearing the path 
for a brighter future. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The concept of overlapping IP rights has a tumultuous history of interpretation. 
From “siloing” and “election,” to being accepted by the Copyright and Patent Of-
fices, to finally being supported by the Federal Circuit, the idea remains divisive. 
Despite this, the Federal Circuit’s acceptance of overlapping IP rights is a wise one. 
So long as judges and examiners are careful in construing the protections provided 
by IP rights, and in granting those rights, we can obtain the benefits of allowing 
multiple IP rights in a single product, while minimizing any risks that may arise. 
 
 125. Oracle Am., Inc., 886 F.3d at 1179. 
 126. See id.; Oracle Am., Inc., 750 F.3d at 1339; Oracle Am., Inc., 2016 WL 3181206, at *1; Oracle 
Am., Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d at 974. 
 127. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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